The Death of Socrates

The Death of Socrates

Friday 30 December 2011

Is human freewill necessary for humans to be morally responsible for their acts?


[SCL] Moral responsibility and culpability is nothing to do with freewill whether this exists or not. A moral agent is culpable for an action if that action is largely determined by their character, nature or habits, as opposed to some external constraint or threat (whether physical or psychological) or some irreformable and incurable pathology or some transient aberration, as might occur as a result of high fever or unintentional intoxication. 

[SCL] If a moral agent’s action or behaviour is potentially correctable by means of training or education (or whatever other just means) then they are culpable and should attract such training or education, which may involve punishment. Punishment, however, should never be understood in terms of retribution or vengeance. It never achieves any good to hurt someone just for the sake of harming them.

[SCL] If a moral agent’s action or behaviour is not susceptible to correction, then they are not culpable. If the action or behaviour is liable to recur and is of a sufficient nuisance, then they should have their freedom curtailed so as to prevent them re-offending. This constraint should not have any penitential character.

[MC] Despite the fact that I agree with you on the importance of character with regards to moral responsibility I think that once a certain level of maturity has been reached, a person is ultimately responsible for their own character. If they choose to indulge bad habits and solidify a bad character, that is an act of free will, and that is what makes them morally culpable.

[SCL] I agree unless you mean that you are sure that there is such a thing as freewill in a naïve sense of “could have done otherwise” and that “choice” implies the exercise of such “freewill”. A person is clearly responsible for their actions because they do them! One doesn't need to be exercising a naïve freewill to be responsible.

[MC] There is a difference between the type of responsibility you're describing and the moral responsibility you were discussing. If a baby picks up a gun and shoots a person, the baby is responsible in the sense that the baby performed the action – thus fitting your definition of responsibility – but the baby is clearly not morally culpable.

[SCL] Why is the baby “clearly” not morally responsible? How come that they picked up the gun and shot someone? We don’t have the full story here. Perhaps the baby was rather advanced in its mental development! Of course if the baby had no idea of what a gun is or what death is and that it could kill someone by shooting them, then my criterion for culpability is not satisfied: the act was then no more than an unfortunate misunderstanding or accident and nothing to do with the agent’s character.

[MC] My definition of the relationship of moral responsibility and free will includes, but is not limited to, the naïve definition you provide. Yes, a person is morally responsible if they could have done otherwise – provided that they also could have known otherwise than they did. A person who does wrong from ignorance is not morally culpable, even though they were responsible for the action.

[SCL] Indeed: but I’d say that this is because the act was not characteristic. Given that they were not cognoscente of its implications they did not envisage or intend them, hence these objective implications cannot be used to evaluate the subjective ethical character of their actions.

[MC] A person who does wrong despite the fact that they could reasonably be supposed to have known better is morally responsible for their actions, either because they deliberately did what they knew to be wrong (an exercise of free will against their moral responsibility) or because they failed to take positive action to remedy their lack of knowledge or previously corrupted character (a failure to exercise free will to discover and/or abide by your moral duties). Either way, free will is of paramount importance.

[SCL] No. What is of paramount importance is their character. I invoke Occam’s Rasor here. All of what you say can be accounted for in terms of whether the act flowed from their own personality and habitual virtues and vices or not. There is absolutely no need to invoke another issue: “freewill”. If some outcome was not envisaged in the act then this outcome played no part in the deliberative process which gave rise to the act. If I do not know that pressing the green button causes someone to be electrocuted to death then my pressing the green button for some other reason (even simply to amuse myself) is not an act of murder. Of course, we agree, that recklessness is itself a seriously immoral characteristic; but it is never clear what precautions one should take or research undertake in order to avoid the just charge of recklessness.

[SCL] Given that an agent did in fact do what they did, and given that this fact is determined by their experience and character and given that their character is itself determined by their experience, nurture and genetic inheritance, how could they have done other than what in fact they did do?

[SCL] It would seem that this is only possible if one invokes “randomness”. This produces two problems. First, a random act cannot possibly be culpable. Second, it is not clear what “random” means, and it may be that nothing can in fact be random! Invoking a non-material soul or spirit changes nothing. The argument repeats in the same way. If I am wrong in my analysis, please show me how. I would be truly indebted to you.

[MC] So, you're a determinist. Makes sense, I suppose.

[SCL] I am not a determinist in the sense that I wish to eliminate the notion of “freewill” from the discussion. In fact I don’t think that strict causality implies physical determinism in any naïve sense (because of “The Butterfly Effect”) any more that freewill is dependent on “could have done otherwise”.

[MC] You can't possibly believe that free will would have anything to do with moral responsibility, because for you free will as such cannot exist. It is at best a questionably-grounded construction other people use to assign responsibility for acts, and at worst a total illusion.

[SCL] Not really. As far as I can see “freewill” as you understand it is an superfluous hypothesis: that is all. I used to think that it was necessary and used this as an argument to justify believing in “naïve freewill”. Then I thought about the whole issue more carefully and concluded that I had been wrong. It seems to me that one only need believe in “naïve freewill” if one wishes to justify retribution and vengeance. As a Platonist, I have no desire to justify such things: my conclusion that “naïve freewill” is spurious follows.

[MC] I agree that “ a random act cannot possibly be culpable.” I am unclear about “it is not clear what ‘random’ means, and it may be that nothing can in fact be random!”. However, even stipulating that I agreed with your objection to an unclear definition, your prefatory sentence still seems staggeringly wrong.

[MC] An agent does, in fact, do what they do – that's tautologous – and it is true that the action proceeds from their experience and character; however, you're slipping in a different use of the word “determined” here. I grant that the motivation for any non-random act I perform may be found somewhere in my experience or in my character (or both). Therefore, those things together determine the range of options which I possess; but I still have a choice of options within that range. And though my experience and character may predispose me toward one of the options, my choice is not thereby determined.

[SCL] How do you know this? What, then, does determine or cause or elicit your action?

[MC] Do you see? We are taught, and fed, and observe, and practice – and so learn – a wide variety of moral stances and positions, correct?

[SCL] I’m not sure of your meaning here, but I suppose that I agree with you.

[MC] Then I fail to see how you can hold that any response of a competent moral agent can possibly be determined in the sense that the agent could not have done otherwise.

[SCL] Similarly, I fail to see how I could hold anything otherwise. The issue here is not about human freewill so much as the occurrence of any event. It would seem that either an account can be made of the event such that one comes to understand how and why this event occurred rather than any other that might seem to be possible before one understood the situation and lawful processes involved; or else no such account can be made. In the first case one has to conclude that the event was caused – if not, strictly speaking “determined” – by the relevant circumstances and lawful processes and “could not have been otherwise”, that is: it was not arbitrary, but coherent. In the second case one has to conclude that the event was random, arbitrary, uncaused and “could definitely have been otherwise”! However, you have agreed that – in the case of human acts – this second possibility is incompatible with culpability; hence it follows that culpability is only a coherent concept in connection with events (and human acts are certainly “events”) which are causal and so “could not have been otherwise”.

[MC] An example. The man who sees a rough-sleeper on the street and gives him five pounds' worth of charity entertains doubts about how they will spend the money, and feels guilty wondering whether they will just spend it on drink and worsen their situation. The man who sees a rough-sleeper on the street and does nothing entertains doubts about whether this might not have been an “honest” down-and-out who would have used the money for food, and feels guilty wondering whether he has just passed up the opportunity to do good by someone else. Both men experienced the same range of options. Perhaps they were predisposed to the choice they made; but the mere fact that they experienced the discomfort of a moral dilemma is evidence that the options they discarded were still live to them. They could have done other than they did.

[SCL] This is a mere assertion. There is no reason to think that it is true. I grant that when one makes a choice in such a situation it “feels” as if “one could have done otherwise”, but all that this means in practice is that there was a choice to be made; and that there was a conflict of uncertainty: not that one could have chosen differently.

‎[MC] I expect that you will attempt to invoke some sort of “complete picture” argument, whereby you argue that the choice of any agent is really determined, and the phenomenon I have discussed above is merely evidence of the complexity of human experiences and characters.

[SCL] Indeed: you haven't taken into account the complete picture. Any specific act is itself caused by their character, their past experiences and by the immediate situation in which they found themselves. It was these things which led them to do what they did, and they could not have done otherwise.”

[MC] But consider human nature. We very often do things differently in similar situations. I have been both men in the above situations, for example – I have both given and failed to give charity. So how can you say which is my dominant response, since I have done both and so clearly could do otherwise?
[SCL] But are the situations exactly the same in all the important factors? Did you have the same emotional mood, and were you in the same financial situation? Did the bum’s appearance inspire equal sympathy in you, or more or less? Were there people near you whom you would care to impress through an act of charity? Was the bum standing close to a liquor store? Had someone been kind or cruel to you recently? Had you heard a sermon on “the Good Samaritan” recently? Had you read an article about the foolishness of giving money to rough sleepers, recently?

[MC] Well, of course the factors won’t all be the same. The likelihood of even the major factors being the same is astronomical; and when you taken into account the minor factors, the chances become so long as to be practically impossible.

[SCL] Well, there you are, then! Different situations lead to different responses; but if you ever ran into a situation that was the same in all the relevant particulars, you couldn't do otherwise than you had done before – barring some change in your character or experience, of course; which would be inevitable, given that the second time was subsequent to the first and so your previous experience relevant to the second event is definitely different to that which was relevant to the first event.

[MC] Very convenient. Since those people would likely never run into exactly the same situation again, you are free to claim that if they respond differently in a similar situation in future, there is some controlling difference, either in an overlooked situational factor or in the modified characters or experiences of those people. So, if I gave money to a bum, and then had a bad experience with bums, the next one I meet and don't give money to, you would explain by saying…
[SCL] …that your new experience was involved in and contributed to your revised judgement.

[MC] There’s a difference between determined and informed. I can still choose to go against my instinctive desire to not give money to this rough-sleeper based on my bad past experience, can’t I? How is that not an exercise of free will?
[SCL] Such a desire would have to be motivated by some event from your past, or some moral code embedded in your character, wouldn't it? Otherwise, it's causeless!

[MC] Sure.
[SCL] You see, then: your moral acts can be accounted for in terms of your experience and character and there is no need to postulate that “you could have done otherwise.”

[MC] But this doesn’t mean thay are determined! Both choices are a part of my moral fabric. That I am inclined toward one or the other at any given point does not mean that both choices are not still available to me. The choice does not have to random to be free, nor do the alternatives have to be perfectly equal in probability. All that matters is that I make a selection from the range available to me, recognizing that of course there is a range available to me.

[SCL] You are now invoking a thing called “freedom” which seems to have all the characteristics of “random” but which you wish, nevertheless, to distinguish from “random”. Moreover you are referring to “probability” which only signifies something in the context of a random variable. In any case, it is not clear what “random means” or that anything is truly random.

[MC] Well, if you admit that you do not know what “random” means, perhaps this allows one to believe that some things which seem “random” are actually significant somhow – and that this justifies calling them “free” rather than simply “random”.

[SCL] Perhaps – but I’d require you to give an account of this; not just assert it as a matter of “blind irrational faith”; and then, it would seem plausible that any such account would render “free” part-and-parcel of the general account of how an an event came to happen. Once more, “free” acts would be accountable in terms of character and experience.

[SCL] Moreover, any choice which you actualize is determined by a host of factors, many of which you might not even be aware of.

[MC] Can you give me an account of which factors would incline me certain ways and why? I mean, it's your thesis that this must be the case. With one neat sentence, you’ve said that you can in principle explain every single thing anyone does. Let’s see you actually do that in practice!

[SCL] I don't have all the necessary information to predict your actions. Of course not! This is part of the difference of an event being “accountable”, “inevitable” and “caused” on the one hand and “determined” and “predictable” on the other.

[MC] Then you can’t prove I don’t have free will!
[SCL] It isn’t my business to do so! I am only intent on showing you that you have no need to account for “freewill”, “moral responsibility” or “culpability” in terms of “could have done otherwise.”

[MC] I have the experience of choosing.
[SCL] Indeed, and so do I; but it is a mistake to interpret this experience in terms of thinking that “you could have done otherwise.” In fact, your decisions are accountable in terms of genetics, mood, character and experience – past and present.

[MC] Let's set aside genes for the moment. I have, in the past, put myself into situations that changed my experiential data, or have deliberately put myself into situations knowing that a change in my character was likely to result. That's an exercise of free will, which neatly incorporates and supersedes your whole outlook.

[SCL] Such a choice would have to be motivated by...

[MC] …previous genetics, experiences, or character. I know! I know! If I pull your string, will you say something else?

[SCL] What would motivate me to do so? It seems to me that I have a surprisingly complete and coherent account of all the experience which you want me to explain. If you could show me an inconsistency or an incompleteness in my account, I would be very grateful; but until you do, I cannot conceive of any reason to deviate from my script – especially in terms of the deviation which you seem to favour as it appears to be incoherent and to explain nothing!

[MC] OK, here is a puzzle for you to chew on:

[MC] Let's say, just for the sake of argument, that my decisions are completely determined by my genetics and my experiences and my character combined. Therefore, none of my decisions is truly free, and so on my definition I am not morally responsible for them.

[SCL] On my account of things, you may very well be responsible for your acts: if your character is reformable – which fact you have not reported.
 
[MC] My genes are entirely a result of a random combination of genes from my parents. My character and experience partly comes from them – they are certainly the dominant figures – but also from a host of others, and even from the arrangement of things in the world. So these people and things exhaustively explain my behaviour, and therefore, they host the moral responsibility for my actions.

[SCL] That is a logical non-sequetor. I have said that culpabiliy arises when (1) an act flowslargely from the nature of the actor and (2) if that nature is susceptible to reformation.

[MC] But these people also got their genetics, characters, and experiences from elsewhere. So none of their decisions on how to raise me was a free one, either...and the genetics passed down to them were totally random, from a limited set of options.

[SCL] On your account of things, yes; but not on mine!

[MC] So the ultimate responsibility for my behaviour must be passed back to the explanations of the genetics, characters, and experiences of those who affected those who affected me. But none of those people can ultimately be held responsible either, for the same reason. In fact, it seems as though no human being can be ultimately responsible for his or her moral behaviour, or for the behaviour of any other person.

[SCL] On your account of things, yes; but not on mine!

[MC] The question, then: WHO OR WHAT IS?

[MC] You have five options, as far as I can see:

[MC] 1) Claim that nothing is ultimately responsible.

[SCL] No!
 
[MC] 2) Claim that Nature is ultimately responsible.

[SCL] No!
 
[MC] 3) Claim that God is ultimately responsible.

[SCL] Yes – but not as you mean it!
 
[MC] 4) Claim that there is an error in my definition of moral responsibility.

[SCL] Yes, as I have been doing consistently all along!
 
[MC] 5) Admit defeat.  
[SCL] Never!

[MC] I assume you will choose the fourth. Selecting the first would render your whole post moot. Selecting the second would be tantamount to admitting that assignment of moral responsibility is based on sheer chance. Selecting the third would be tantamount to holding God responsible for the sins of all of humanity. And since you clearly don't agree with my view that moral responsibility is tied to free will, in a choice between the only remaining options of #4 and #5, you must pick the former.

[SCL] This is an example of excellent logical reasoning!

[MC] Now, then. WHY?

[SCL] I hope that this is clear from what I have said above. To reiterate:

[SCL] Moral responsibility and culpability is nothing to do with freewill whether this exists or not. A moral agent is culpable for an action if that action is largely determined by their character, nature or habits, as opposed to some external constraint or threat (whether physical or psychological) or some irreformable and incurable pathology or some transient aberration, as might occur as a result of high fever or unintentional intoxication. 

[SCL] If a moral agent’s action or behaviour is potentially correctable by means of training or education (or whatever other just means) then they are culpable and should attract such training or education, which may involve punishment. Punishment, however, should never be understood in terms of retribution or vengeance. It never achieves any good to hurt someone just for the sake of harming them.

[SCL] If a moral agent’s action or behaviour is not susceptible to correction, then they are not culpable. If the action or behaviour is liable to recur and is of a sufficient nuisance, then they should have their freedom curtailed so as to prevent them re-offending. This constraint should not have any penitential character.

[SCL] As far as I can see “freewill” as you understand it is an superfluous hypothesis: that is all. I used to think that it was necessary and used this as an argument to justify believing in “naïve freewill”. Then I thought about the whole issue more carefully and concluded that I had been wrong. It seems to me that one only need believe in “naïve freewill” if one wishes to justify retribution and vengeance. As a Platonist, I have no desire to justify such things: my conclusion that “naïve freewill” is spurious follows.

[SCL] The issue here is not about human freewill so much as the occurrence of any event. It would seem that either an account can be made of the event such that one comes to understand how and why this event occurred rather than any other that might seem to be possible before one understood the situation and lawful processes involved; or else no such account can be made. In the first case one has to conclude that the event was caused – if not, strictly speaking “determined” – by the relevant circumstances and lawful processes and “could not have been otherwise”, that is: it was not arbitrary, but coherent. In the second case one has to conclude that the event was random, arbitrary, uncaused and “could definitely have been otherwise”! However, you have agreed that – in the case of human acts – this second possibility is incompatible with culpability; hence it follows that culpability is only a coherent concept in connection with events (and human acts are certainly “events”) which are causal and so “could not have been otherwise”.